The architecture of the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was based on the rationale that one community would act as a "counterweight" and a "balance" against the other. However problematic such an arrangement may have been, following the the departure of the Turkish Cypriots from the state structure, the Republic of Cyprus was effectively left without the necessary institutional checks and balances.

The Institute for the Study of Politics and Democracy submits, in the context of this vital public dialogue, a series of proposals that have been drawn up by the Institute's collaborators. These proposals concern a number of issues, such as, for example, the mechanism of selecting independent authorities and officials' appointments by the President of the Republic, the unchecked powers of the General Prosecutor, the terms of office of the various independent officials, etc.

In order to discuss all these issues, and precisely in light of the need for institutional reforms that will strengthen citizens' trust in the state and institutions through the comparative lens of the experience of other countries, the Institute is organising on 13th December a Policy Meeting with academics and specialist experts.